Most regulators require that an applicant for registration or licensure be of “good character”. Where the applicant has previously demonstrated a lack of integrity, propriety, or honesty, regulators often apply the Armstrong criteria to assess whether they are now of good character, including:
- The nature and duration of the misconduct;
- Whether the applicant is remorseful;
- What rehabilitative efforts have been taken and their success;
- The applicant’s conduct since the misconduct; and
- The passage of time since the misconduct.
Ontario’s highest court has provided additional guidance on how good character requirements (which can be worded in various ways) should be applied: Law Society of Ontario v. AA, 2026 ONCA 47.
AA applied to become a lawyer. He did not disclose that he had sexually abused three children, one of whom was his daughter. When the regulator learned of the concern, he withdrew his application. Two years later, he renewed his application, arguing that he was now of good character given the passage of time, his therapy, and remorse and new insight. He filed medical and psychological reports indicating that he was at low risk of repeating the conduct. He also proposed a condition that he is not to be alone with children when practising. The hearing and appeal panels agreed that he was of good character after applying the Armstrong criteria, as did the Divisional Court. The regulator appealed to the Court of Appeal for Ontario.
The Court held that the decisions of the hearing and appeal panels were unreasonable because they did not conduct the necessary holistic analysis of whether the evidence now established that AA’s licensure was in the public interest. The Armstrong criteria should not be treated as a scorecard or checklist without considering the overall purposes of the good character requirement. The Court said:
In my view, good character cannot be reasonably understood or applied in isolation from the broader objectives of the Act, which take the questions of individual licensing applicants’ trustworthiness, and the public’s trust and confidence in the legal professions generally ….
The question, therefore, is not simply whether a person has shown that they are remorseful, or that they have been successful in their rehabilitation, or that their conduct since the misconduct at issue has been exemplary, or that a significant amount of time has passed since the misconduct. These inquiries are undertaken for the purpose of determining whether the applicant seeking to be licensed is of good character. This purpose, in turn, requires the Tribunal to step back and engage in a broader assessment. That assessment will generally include the seriousness of the prior conduct, and the impact on the public’s trust and confidence in the legal professions, if any, of finding that an applicant is of good character notwithstanding that conduct and licensing them.
The Court also found that the condition proposed by AA and imposed by the panels was inconsistent with the finding that AA was now of good character and could be trusted to be in the presence of children. The Court returned the matter to the hearing panel for a new decision.
The Court also directed that each tribunal and court dealing with the matter needed to make its own assessment of whether to keep AA’s identity secret. The Court concluded that the shame that AA and his family would experience if his identity was disclosed in the course of the tribunal and court proceedings did not outweigh the open-court principle. However, identifying that AA’s daughter had been sexually abused went to the core of her identity and warranted a protective order. Nevertheless, that issue would have to be revisited if AA was eventually licensed, as there would be a strong countervailing interest in the public knowing of AA’s past conduct when choosing to use his services.
